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Abstract—Many attacks presented on Bitcoin are facilitated
by its real world implementation, which is rather centralized.
In addition, communications between Bitcoin nodes are not
encrypted, which can be explored by an attacker to launch
attacks. In this paper, we give a brief overview of possible routing
attacks on Bitcoin. As future work, we will identify possible
central points in the Bitcoin network, evaluate potential attacks
on it, and propose solutions to mitigate the identified issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
As originally proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto [1], Bitcoin
places itself as a fully distributed cryptocurrency that removes
the need for central authorities. However, despite the enormous
success of Bitcoin, many attacks have been identified because
of the conflict between the Bitcoin’s envisioned distributed
architecture and its real world implementation. Moreover, the
Bitcoin architecture is, in practice, rather centralized due to the
following reasons. First, the majority of the Bitcoin nodes are
hosted by a small number of autonomous systems (AS) [2].
Second, the mining power [3] is shared among a small set of
entities — several mining pools control the vast majority of the
computing power in Bitcoin. For example, as of March 19th
2018, 14 top mining pools control 99.6% mining power in
Bitcoin1. Third, some Bitcoin nodes are more stable, and new
nodes prefer to establish connections with them for a better
connectivity. Thus, a small set of these stable nodes maintains
a majority of the connections among all Bitcoin nodes [4]. In
fact, the centralization properties of implementing Bitcoin in
real world lead to routing attacks possible. We show existing
routing attack in Section II.
The Bitcoin network is a peer-to-peer network that relies
on the Internet, where each node disseminates transactions
and blocks in order to reach consensus. For instance, a node
can receive, verify and forward transactions, and validated
transactions are collected by nodes with mining power to
blocks. Because of unencrypted messages exchanging among
nodes, the attacker is able to gain some critical information by
establishing connection to victim. This makes deanonymisa-
tion attack possible. We also show existing deanonymisation
attack in Section II.
II. EXISTING ATTACKS
Routing attack. Due to the highly centralized autonomous
systems in the Bitcoin network, malicious messages can be
injected into one autonomous system to announce incorrect
1https://blockchain.info/pools
IP prefixes, which leads to the network traffics going into
wrong locations. It makes the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
hijacking attack [2] possible in the Bitcoin network, where an
attacker can delay the information propagation and partition
the Bitcoin network in order to waste mining power, or spend
one coin more than once. The eclipse attack was described
in 2015 [7], where unsolicited incoming connections are used
by an attacker to send bogus information to a victim to force
it to restart. After that, the attacker can monopolize all 125
connections of victim and, with a high probability, control the
endhost.
Deanonymisation attack. Fanti and Viswanath described
Deanonymisation attacks [5], which aim at disclosing the IP
address of nodes that generate transactions, even those located
behind a Network Address Translation (NAT).
Since each client node has 8 entry nodes, and the generated
transactions of the client are always first forwarded to its 8
entry nodes, it is possible to identify the entry nodes of a client
node [5]. In addition, some approaches rely on the Bitcoin
relay pattern, which can be used to identify the IP address
of a transaction creator, i.e, the payer, based on the following
observations [6]. First, a node that was the first forwarding a
transaction is likely to be the payer. Second, a node is likely to
be a payer if it re-transmits the transaction. Moreover, a node
is likely to be a mining pool if the generated blocks from the
pool were relayed frequently and firstly via that IP address
during 10 days period [2].
III. NETWORK-OPTIMIZED ROUTING ATTACK
The hijacking attack [2] aims at isolating a set of nodes
from the Bitcoin network at the AS-level. To make a success-
ful hijacking, an attacker must block all connections of the
isolated nodes. If a node cannot be full blocked, then they
call this node a “leakage point”. The authors then proposed
their approach to detect the leakage points and remove them
from the target set that is going to be isolated. However, no
existing research has focused on how to select the target set
of nodes to make the isolation more efficiently, and on how
to improve the current situation. As previously explained, the
eclipse attack [7] aims to control all the connections of a node
in the Bitcoin network. However, the existing eclipse attack
does not work for nodes that are behind of a NAT, as they
do not have any incoming connections. In this case, we plan
to study how a node select and maintain its entry nodes to
evaluate the feasibility of this attack.
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Fig. 1: Central nodes (A,B,C,D,E,F) in Bitcoin net-
work, where a,b,c,e denotes an outgoing con-
nection of node A,B,C,E respectively.
By default, each node can accept 117 incoming connections,
and create 8 outgoing connections in Bitcoin network. Fanti
and Viswanath pointed out two types of nodes: the server node
that accepts incoming connection and client node that does
not [5]. Due to the incoming and outgoing connections of
each node being asymmetric, some nodes probably maintain
more connections than others, and are frequently connected
to other nodes as their outgoing nodes. Influential nodes [8]
were defined and characterized by the fact that they connected
server nodes with mining pools. To distinguish from influential
nodes, we assume that there exist some central nodes in the
network (Figure 1) beyond server nodes, which are frequently
used to maintain the outgoing connections of server nodes.
Furthermore, if we study the AS-level topology between those
central nodes, then we might find some network points that
frequently appear in the intersections of nodes’ connections.
We call the point “central point” (Figure 2).
As shown in Figure 2, if the adversary can identify the CP
(central point) in the Bitcoin network, then it can disrupt the
Bitcoin protocol by attacking CP. As a result, links (a,b,c,e)
would subsequently be attacked, and the network partitioned
into two parts, (A,B,F) and (C,D,E).
IV. FUTURE WORK
To verify our observation, we will analyze the existing peer-
to-peer network in the Bitcoin system. As a first step, we
will monitor the Bitcoin network in order to infer the Bitcoin
network’s topology. Secondly, we will identify the central
nodes and central points from the topology we gained. Lastly,
we will evaluate the effectiveness of existing attacks based on
our analysis.
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Fig. 2: Central point (CP) in Bitcoin network, where
different outgoing connections a,b,c,e might
share the same point somewhere in network.
The point can be autonomous system or router,
and we call them central points.
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